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I. INTRODUCTION
If asked to imagine the stereotypical statute-oriented, rule-bound
attorney, a likely vision will be that of a dark suited and carefully
coiffured corporate lawyer. A corporate lawyer does not exist without
a statutorily created client. That lawyer's fidelity is owed to an entity
that is entirely the product of meticulously drafted statutes, articles of
incorporation, and by-laws.
Formalism abounds in corporate law. That which "is" rules the
creation, organization, operation, and eventual death (by dissolution or
* Professor of Law, University of Florida; B.A., Honours School of Jurisprudence,
Oxford 1964; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1966.
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merger) of the corporate client. Every effort is made to avoid "oughts"
in this world. Where statutes and corporate documents end, written
shareholder agreements take over, governing such disparate conduct as
the election of directors, officer salaries, dividend distributions, sale of
shares, and whatever else may appeal to the fruitful mind of the
corporate lawyer. Nothing is left to chance, or so it appears. Now let us
move from appearance to reality.
I practiced and taught corporate law for more years than I care to
count before it dawned on me that courts answered most of the really
difficult and interesting corporate law problems by resort to principles
of fairness and equity, rather than statutory or similar positivist
standards. That realization obsessed me to the point that I began writing
an article entitled, "What Would Immanuel Kant Have Said About
Hostile Takeovers?" Of course I had no idea what he would have said
(which is the principal reason the article never moved beyond its title),
but the point was, and remains, that Kantian principles of reason and
universal maxims may well apply to the hostile takeover battleground.
Hence the notion of "corporate natural law." The notion is intended
to convey the fact that equitable principles rather than statutes and other
seemingly authoritative sources answer many of the most substantial
corporate law questions. I use the term "natural law" to mean an effort
by courts to find an answer based upon fairness and "rightness." Even
where codified or written standards exist, a court will apply and
interpret them in accordance with what the court finds "just." As stated
by no less an august corporate law authority than the Delaware Supreme
Court, "inequitable action does not become permissible simply because
it is legally possible."' Even where application of the fairness doctrine
is not apparent on the surface, inarticulate major premises of equity and
fairness often lead courts to their stated results.2 What is surprising is
not that this phenomenon exists, but that it is so pervasive. Our dark
suited corporate attorney thus shares with the tweedy public defender the
burden to persuade the court that the urged outcome is just. This essay
examines a handful of corporate law areas where "natural law" abounds.
These include challenges to corporate action for exceeding proper
corporate purposes, attempts to hold shareholders liable for corporate
obligations, claims against management and directors under the duty of
1. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (holding that an
action by board amending bylaw to move annual meeting date was technically proper but
inequitable conduct in light of pending shareholder proxy fight).
2. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,466 (1897) ("Behind
the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding.").
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care rubric, criminal and regulatory actions, challenges to transactions
that appear to favor controlling shareholders, claims arising out of
conflict of interest transactions, attempts to protect shareholder
preemptive rights, disputes regarding close corporation "freeze outs" of
minority shareholders, and claims based upon insider trading profits.
Before embarking on this review, I should address the ques-
tion-"O.k., even if you're right, so what?" To my mind, it is a big "so
what?" If corporate law is perceived as rule-bound and formalistic,
advice to corporate decisionmakers, legal arguments, and some judicial
decisions will reflect those constraints. If, on the other hand, corporate
law is perceived (as it is) as a human drama involving open-ended,
equity-oriented conflicts among competing interests, then legal advice,
decisions made thereunder, and courtroom arguments could take on a
much different hue. It is a hue that brings into focus the underlying
purposes of rules and the impact of particular decisions upon varying
corporate constituencies. Sensitivity to these broader, underlying
questions means that lawyers faced with advising clients in difficult
areas may have to take the somewhat courageous course of admitting
that their specialized legal training and expertise is not sufficient to the
task. Additional elements of fairness and equity demand considerations
for which the lawyer's expertise is no better than the average person's.
Professor Elkins has described the attributes of legal professionalism as
detached, objective, unemotional, and in control of the client-attributes
that define a legal persona that is a "facade for the public, a mask for
the private self of feelings."3 Recognition of natural law's role in
corporate law encourages the elimination of the mask and enlargement
of the lawyer's field of inquiry and analysis.
Positivist analysis is comforting when an attorney must draft opinion
letters affecting substantial assets and potential liabilities. Yet, analysis
limited to formalism is, as the accountants would say, cold comfort
alone, and lawyers aware of that limitation better serve their clients by
directing attention to equity's potential response to the consequences of
intended action. Corporate law is fundamentally about relationships
among people. However much we have come to reify corporations, the
fundamental fact remains that corporations do not act except through
and upon human agents. Professor Harold Laski noted years ago the
consequence of not appreciating the human drama within every
corporate action:
3. James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L.
REv. 735, 749 (1978). The lawyer's role in fostering "the basic myth" of the law's certainty is
a major premise of Jerome Frank in LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949).
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The danger of the doctrine that corporate personality is real
is the danger that we give our consciences into the keeping
of some national government, some church, or some other
association and that their operation is then organized from
without until we fail to realise [sic] that we have become
nothing more than an automatic instrument in the hands of
men into the validity of whose power it never occurs to us
to enquire.
Inquiry is the essence of the judicial process, and more often than is
generally assumed, that inquiry is directed (explicitly or not) by "natural
law" doctrine.
I. REPRENTATIVE AREAS DOMINATED BY EQUITY
A. Corporate Purpose
Fairness and equity doctrines surfaced early in corporate law history
with the judicial reaction to the ultra vires doctrine. Courts avoided the
unnecessarily limiting and inequitable results of the ultra vires doctrine
even in the nascent days of corporate development, when state statutes
demanded limited definition of corporate purpose as a brake on
unregulated corporate growth.' Fairness was often the specifically stated
basis for a decision. In one Florida case, an obligor under a contract to
sell land argued that the contract should be voided because the assignee
purchaser was a corporation whose charter forbade the corporate
indebtedness that would be incurred through the purchase.6 Having
found that the corporation was authorized to acquire title to property, the
court rejected the obligor's ultra vires argument with the assertion that
the doctrine "should never be applied where it will defeat the ends of
justice, if such a result can be avoided."7 Doctrines of implied powers
and estoppel frequently were invoked to avoid the harsh results of
declaring a corporate contract or act invalid.' Implied powers and
4. Harold J. Laski, Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. CHI. L. REV.
575, 582 (1948).
5. In the past 30 years, state statutes have moved from requiring a detailed statement of
corporate purpose in the articles of incorporation to permitting corporations to state their purpose
in as broad a manner as desired, for example, to engage in any lawful business. Most
corporations take advantage of this open-ended invitation and thereby substantially eliminate
recourse by shareholders or others to the ultra vires doctrine.
6. Palm Beach Estate v. Croker, 143 So. 792, 802 (1932).
7. Id. The court noted that, having tendered the purchase price pursuant to contract, the
corporation also was estopped to deny its ability to purchase the property. Fd.
8. E.g., Jacksonville, Mayport, Pablo Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Hooper, 160 U.S. 514, 523-26
(1896) (holding that a corporation with the stated purpose to run a railroad had implied power
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estoppel principles can be broadly or narrowly applied. They are, at
bottom, equitable doctrines clothed in legalese. Courts inclined to
formalism could well deny the "implication" of the power to operate a
hotel by reason of the stated power to operate a railroad. Few courts
exhibited such tendencies regarding the ultra vires doctrine. Most courts
chose to do that which it perceived to be most fair under the circum-
stances.
The ultra vires doctrine is virtually dead. Statutes now permit
corporate purpose to be defined in the articles in broad, open-ended
terms. There might be corporations occasionally formed whose charters
adopt limited purposes, perhaps as a protective device insisted upon by
shareholders to assure that the company does not branch into unexpected
fields without shareholder approval. In such circumstances, the question
may arise whether a particular activity is beyond the stated powers of
the corporation, thus raising traditional ultra vires claims. We can expect
that courts will continue their tradition of refusing to apply the ultra
vires doctrine where fairness to the parties dictates otherwise.
Shareholder challenges to corporate charitable contributions and other
public interest oriented activities are perhaps the most fertile area for
arguments analogous to the ultra vires doctrine. Arguments are
sometimes heard that charitable expenditures and projects serve no
corporate purpose and are contrary to profit-maximizing goals. Express
statutory provisions permitting charitable contributions have made such
arguments more difficult in recent years.9 However, even before express
statutory authority was granted, courts were denying shareholder
challenges based on strict readings of corporate statutes and charters.
One such case involved a $1500 contribution to Princeton University by
a New Jersey maker of valves and fire hydrants. 0 Despite the seeming
disparity between the corporation's products and the lofty goals of the
ivory tower recipient, the corporation's president boldly testified that
such a contribution generated good will and created a favorable business
climate." Not a scintilla of direct evidence was or could be introduced
to support such assertions. The court wisely chose not to rely on such
ephemeral speculations. Instead, the court rested its opinion on a
to build and operate a hotel at the end of the railroad line); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v.
Missouri Poultry & Game Co., 229 S.W. 813, 814 (Mo. 1921) (holding that a non-performing
party under a contract is estopped to assert ultra vires defense).
9. See REv. MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 3.02 (1984) ("Unless its articles of incorporation
provide otherwise, every corporation has... power:... (13) to make donations for the public
welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes. .. ").
10. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582-83 (N.J. 1953).
11. Id.
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presumed moral obligation of a corporation to "discharg[e] its high
obligations as a constituent of our modem social structure."' 2
Challenges to charitable contributions, or analogous activities
consonant with social causes, have continued even after statutory
authorization. Rarely have such challenges succeeded. Case law reflects
judicial adoption of the moral notion that corporations, like persons,
ought to have the freedom to make charitable donations and engage in
socially constructive projects. Courts need not go as far as Professor
Elliott Weiss's argument that corporations, having been created by law,
"have as their ultimate purpose the welfare of society."' 3 It is sufficient
that courts recognize, as they do, that corporations may choose altruism
over profit-maximization provided that long-term corporate goals are not
sacrificed.
B. The Corporate Shield
Creditors who find their corporate obligor lacking in funds often are
inclined to seek redress from the principal shareholders or parent
company. That requires convincing a court to "pierce" the traditional
corporate shield against personal liability of shareholders for corporate
debts. Although such attempts lose more often than not, the success rate
is sufficient to make the "piercing the corporate veil" concept perhaps
the most litigated of all corporate law subjects. 4
The proclivity toward litigation may stem in part from the ambiguity
of standards. Jurisprudence in this area is rife with phrases such as "alter
ego," "agency," and "instrumentality," all of which suffer from lack of
clarity. Some courts insist that fraud is a necessary element for a
piercing case, yet that concept too is fundamentally an eye-of-the-
beholder issue. Ultimately, as some courts profess, the issue is one of
faimess.' Given the inability of the corporate obligor to pay the
liability, is it "right" that the shareholders, or the parent company,
should bear that burden? Often this is not an easy question. This is not
a simple good-guy versus bad-guy shootout. Both sides often wear gray
hats. Shareholders responsible for depleted corporate assets are
confronted by creditors who contracted with the corporate entity without
12. Id. at 590.
13. Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate
Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 418 (1981).
14. This is admittedly anecdotal, but I am convinced after years of reading advance sheets
that no corporate law subject is as frequently litigated as the piercing doctrine.
15. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 E3d 1451, 1458 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that in
order to state an alter ego claim under Delaware law, a plaintiff must "demonstrate an overall
element of injustice or unfairness").
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security or shareholder guarantees. Creditors shift their focus only
because the relationship soured. In seeking judicial recourse, creditors
ask courts for all-or-nothing decisions in cases where neither side might
have a complete equitable claim or defense. Yet courts have no choice
but to make an all-or-nothing decision.16 Judicial decisions become
clothed in traditional language. Yet such language does not alter the
underlying question which is to decide what is "right" in the given set
of circumstances.
C. Management Obligations and the Duty of Care
The contour of the director's duty of care presents perhaps the most
heated area of corporate litigation in recent years. The issue became so
embroiled that state legislatures intervened at the behest of corporate
management to alter the course of over one hundred years of judicially
developed jurisprudence." The result of such legislation is that the duty
of care doctrine remains only in a weakened condition, shorn of
effective sanctions against offending management.
Still, the duty of care doctrine exists and will continue to be asserted
by shareholders and others seeking injunctive or other appropriate relief
from allegedly unreasonable board decisions. It is, for example, the most
important question in the monumental battles incurred in the corporate
takeover arena when target management imposes defensive measures
against unwanted suitors. It is also the central concern for board
decisions that may have a disparate effect on varying classes of stock
within the corporation, especially in the handful (although growing
number) of corporations that issue so-called "alphabet" or tracking
stocks that provide equity stakes in limited segments of the
corporation's business. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that in
such situations the directors are necessarily governed by a "duty of
fairness."' 8
16. One of the failings, I believe, of our system of jurisprudence is that we have no
alternatives for courts other than all-or-nothing decisions. A winner-take-all philosophy
exacerbates adversarial conflict and constrains courts from decisions that could be the fairest
under the circumstances. This is the grist for another article.
17. In the past decade nearly every state has adopted provisions that allow corporations
to immunize their directors from personal liability for breaches of duty of care except in very
limited contexts. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1997) (permitting a charter
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty except in limited, defined
circumstances).
18. Jeffrey J. Hass, Directorial Fiduciary Duties in a Tracking Stock Equity Structure: The
Need for a Duy of Fairness, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2089, 2092 (1996) (arguing that traditional duty
of care and loyalty concepts fail to address the unique fairness issues raised by intergroup
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The duty of care doctrine is based entirely on the elusive concept of
"reasonableness." Scores of law review articles have attempted to define
that standard,19 and judicial decisions roam over the negligence field
from ordinary to gross,2" as if those terms impose an objectivity on this
subject. Delaware's notorious Smith v. Van Gorkom case is a good
illustration of the lack of objectively defined standards.2 The decision
by the Trans Union Corporation board of directors to accept an
acquirer's offer of merger was made with unusual speed, 2 with no
significant advance notice, 23 and with minimal supporting documenta-
tion.24 Did these factors indicate a lack of due care? A majority of the
Delaware Supreme Court believed so.' However, neither Delaware's
respected Chancery Court 6 nor Justice McNeilly, dissenting from the
Supreme Court's finding, agreed.27 Justice McNeilly based much of his
dissent on the collective experience of the board members, which for the
outside directors constituted seventy-eight years of combined experience
as chief. executive officers and fifty-three years cumulative service as
Trans Union directors.28 In his opinion, these directors "knew Trans
Union like the back of their hands and were more than well qualified to
make on the spot informed business judgments., 29 Many post-opinion
conflicts among various equity securities).
19. Among them is one that I attempted. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment
Rule, 62 TX. L. REV. 591 (1983).
20. Delaware, for example, has the most extensive body of case law regarding duty of
care. Yet, precise standards appear lacking. A gross negligence standard was expressly adopted
as Delaware law in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("under the business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence."). Yet, in
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 1987 WL 28436 (Del. Ch. 1987), Vice-Chancellor
Berger reviewed cases and commentary and concluded that ordinary negligence is Delaware's
standard in director neglect claims. New York appears to embrace the ordinary negligence
standard. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F2d 264,274 (2d Cir. 1986)
("The duty of due care requires that a director's decision be made on the basis of 'reasonable
diligence' in gathering and considering material information."). In trying to sort out the subtleties
of differences among such standards, the game may not be worth the candle, given the dearth
of successful actions regardless of standard. For a discussion of the reasons for such dearth, see
Cohn, supra note 19, at 598-600.
21. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding breach of duty of care in directors'
decisionmaking process which lead to acceptance of acquiring company's merger offer).
22. See id. at 869 (noting that the board only met two hours before approving the merger).
23. Id. at 893.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 898 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 895 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
(Vol. 48
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commentators supported Justice McNeilly's views. For our purposes, the
question is not which side was correct. Our inquiry is, rather, whether
it is possible objectively to determine such correctness? Would the
Supreme Court's decision have been different had the directors extended
the meeting by another two hours to discuss corporate valuation? What
if they had made a quick phone call to obtain on-the-spot advice from
an investment brokerage firm? What if they had advance notice of the
purpose of the special meeting? All of these factors would have been
weighed in the balance, but would the scales have tipped? Such
uncertainties only highlight the inescapable conclusion that the duty of
care doctrine is ultimately decided on the basis of what a court believes
is the "right" answer, that is, the fairest answer under the circumstances.
In the overwhelming majority of cases, courts are reluctant to find
breach of that duty. Does that mean directors are uniformly circumspect
in the discharge of their fiduciary duties? Much more likely is the
conclusion that the "right" answer as far as most courts are concerned
is to protect directors from the draconian results of finding a breach of
duty.3" This is a value judgment which has little if anything to do with
the expressed statutory standards.
An equally uncertain standard exists with regard to derivative
actions. Shareholder demands on the board, required by most corporate
statutes, may result in the board deciding that the action should be
dismissed. The court must then decide whether the board's decision was
made in good faith.3" How is a court to decide good faith? Beyond the
fact of disinterestedness of the board committee, there is no objective
standard to measure "good faith." In the absence of objective criteria,
a court's decision to accept or reject the board's recommendation will
be based on general equitable principles.
D. Criminal Liability and Regulations
In criminal and regulatory contexts, fairness principles also play
dominant roles. Corporations are subject to a host of regulatory statutes,
including antitrust, OSHA, environmental, securities, tax, and employ-
ment discrimination issues. Violation of such regulations can lead to
30. Perhaps now that directors often are shielded from personal monetary damages, see
supra note 17, courts will be less hesitant to find a breach of duty. However, there is not much
evidence to date that courts have relaxed their protective vigilance of directors despite the
immunization statutes.
31. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides that a derivative action shall
be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if the directors' litigation committee
"has determined in good faith" that maintenance of the action is not in the corporation's
interests. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.44(a).
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substantial fines and other penalties. There is no blueprint in corporate
codes or black letter law to assure avoidance of these sanctions. What
is apparent, though, is that adherence to corporate formalities is
insufficient. A recent article examining the issue of corporate criminal
sanctions noted that:
[O]rganizations are viewed as public trustees with duties to
ensure that activities initiated on their behalf generally are
undertaken within applicable laws. In practical terms, these
duties require firms to couple the delegation of job respon-
sibilities to individual corporate employees with further
management efforts to ensure the employees act lawfully in
carrying out their duties. A "good citizen" corporation that
takes reasonable steps in this regard can escape blame and
criminal liability for subsequent misconduct.3
The corporate "good citizen" concept permeates other fields 3 and
incorporates (no pun intended) duties not specified in corporate codes
and articles of incorporation.
E. Majority Shareholder Obligations
If you pay the piper you call the tune. So conclude many a control-
ling shareholder. Yet, controlling shareholders occasionally discover
to their dismay that corporate tunes might not be quite the ones they
want to call. Limitations are particularly evident regarding actions or
proposals that may involve unequal treatment between controlling and
minority shareholders. A "hot" subject matter for a while concerned
whether minority shareholders have any claim to the premium on the
sale of a corporation's controlling shares. Perlman v. Feldmann35 was
the high watermark for minority shareholders, but in recent years that
case has lost its value as precedent supporting minority shareholder
claims on control share premiums. Yet, many other areas remain for
32. Richard S. Gruner & Louis M. Brown, Organizational Justice: Recognizing and
Rewarding the Good Citizen Corporation, 21 J. CORP. L. 731, 734 (1996). Accord In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that directors
have a duty to monitor corporate activities in good faith).
33. See supra text accompanying note 13.
34. The term "controlling shareholder" includes both those who own a majority of the
voting stock as well as those who, by virtue of substantial stock ownership, group voting
patterns, family ties, or other arrangements, effectively control corporate decisionmaking.
35. 219 F.2d 173, 177-78 (2d Cir.) (holding that, in a sale of controlling shares to an end
user of the corporation's product, controlling shareholders could not retain the premium and
were required to share it with non-selling minority shareholders), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
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judicial scrutiny. They range from corporate buybacks of securities to
parent-subsidiary allocations of tax benefits. Indeed, judicial scrutiny
will arise in any circumstance in which minority shareholders allege that
the controlling interests have utilized their power to aggrandize their
interests. It is not difficult to imagine the controlling shareholders' non-
legal response-namely, if they can't use their power to aggrandize their
interests, then what is their power for?
Jones v. H.E Ahmanson & Co.36 presents the apogee thus far for
judicial protection of minority interests. The defendants, controlling
shareholders of a highly profitable savings and loan association, formed
a separate corporation and exchanged their S&L shares for the shares of
the new corporation, which then became the S&L's controlling
shareholder as a holding company.37 The holding company's shares.
were issued in large numbers, thus permitting development of a public
market in the shares, something that had not existed for the S&L
shares.38 The controlling shareholders were thus able to create liquidity
for their investment in the S&L.39 The remaining S&L shareholders
(approximately fifteen percent) continued to hold illiquid shares in the
operating company.4' Although the minority was disadvantaged vis-d-
vis the prior control shareholders regarding market liquidity,4' the
minority was no worse off than it had been prior to formation of the
holding company. Despite this, the California Supreme Court found that
the majority had breached a duty to them.4' The Court declared that no
action by control shareholders could result in a benefit to themselves
without a similar benefit to minority shareholders unless there was a
"compelling business purpose that would render their action fair under
the circumstances."43 What was the judicial rule based upon? It was
based solely on fairness among the parties, as there is no statutory
doctrine demanding equality among differing economic interests. The
court acknowledged as much in its conclusion that there exists a
"comprehensive rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority
in any transaction [involving] controlling shareholders.""
Courts in other jurisdictions have not announced as sweeping a
formula as that in Ahmanson, but numerous cases reflect the influence
36. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
37. Id, at 467.
38. Id. at 468, 469.
39. Id. at 469.
40. See id. at 467, 468-69.
41. Id. at 476.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 474.
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of the goal of achieving a just distribution of benefits among the parties.
Thus, for example, a buyback of shares from controlling shareholders
of a close corporation gave the minority shareholders the right to
demand equal treatment.45 Corporations have the undeniable right to
repurchase shares from shareholders, and there was no evidence in the
particular case that the buybacks caused economic injury to the
corporation or to the minority shareholders.' The decision was based
simply on a doctrine of fairness, a doctrine not enunciated in corporate
codes or instruments.
The influence of the fairness doctrine is illustrated in a case between
shareholderg of a close corporation where one of the shareholders
objected to the trial judge's instructions to the jury that defined the
duties among shareholders to include "furthering the interests of one
another., 47 The objecting shareholder argued that shareholders, like
directors, owe a duty to the corporation, and that their acts must be
judged in relation to the corporation's interests, not the interests of
individual shareholders. The court rejected the argument and emphasized
the personal relationships inherent within a close corporation and the
concomitant fiduciary duties that flow among the participants. 48 That
decision was not based, nor could it be, on any statutory principle. It
was grounded on the court's perception of what ought to be the
reciprocal obligations of business associates.
Fairness is an "eye of the beholder" concept. Thus there will be
instances where similar facts lead to differing judicial results. Take, for
example, the situation where a profitable parent corporation with a loss
subsidiary files a consolidated tax return that creates substantial tax
savings to the parent. Should the parent retain the entirety of the savings
or distribute the savings in some proportionate manner to the subsidiary
(that, after all, was responsible for the savings and probably needs the
money worse than the parent)? This is ultimately a fairness question.
There are no other standards. Some courts have held that the parent may
choose to keep the entire savings,49 others have required a sharing of
the tax savings with the subsidiary." Both decisions are similarly
grounded on the perceived equity of the circumstances despite the
differences in conclusions.
45. See Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accord
Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
46. See 7llis, 395 So. 2d at 619.
47. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988).
48. Id. at 352.
49. E.g., Myerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 793-94 (Del. Ch. 1967).
50. E.g., Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank of Miami, 136 So. 2d 656, 658-59 (Fla. 3d DCA
1962).
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F. Conflict of Interest Transactions
Corporate law has moved a long way from the early days when strict
trust doctrine demanded the per se voidability of transactions between
the corporation and its directors. Every state has modified common law
by statute, and today such transactions are voidable only under limited
conditions. Generally, such statutes provide that a conflict of interest
transaction between the corporation and a director or officer may be
voided if: (a) the transaction was not approved by a disinterested
majority of the board, (b) the transaction was not approved by a
disinterested majority of shareholders, or (c) the transaction is not fair
to the corporation." The formula set forth in most states is in the
disjunctive. A literal reading of the conflict of interest provision
suggests that any one of the three stated conditions is sufficient to
validate a conflict transaction. Under such interpretation, fairness (the
third alternative) is not at issue unless the transaction was not approved
either by disinterested directors or by shareholders.
Despite statutory language, courts have insisted that fairness to the
corporation is an indispensable element in judging the validity of a
conflict transaction. Courts have regarded the statute as authorizing
conflict transactions, thus modifying early common law, but such
transactions remain voidable unless proven fair to the corporation. The
disjunctive statutory language therefore does not eliminate the need to
examine fairness; it simply operates in some jurisdictions to shift the
burden of proof on the fairness question from the directors to the
complaining shareholders. As one California court stated, the fact that
there was literal compliance with the disinterested shareholder provision
"does not operate to limit the fiduciary duties owed by a director to all
the stockholders, nor does it operate to condone.., a harsh and unfair
bargain with the corporation he is supposed to represent."52 Delaware
courts, often criticized for pro-management bias, are no less demanding
in requiring examination of the fairness of the transaction despite the
directors' technical adherence to the approval portions of Delaware's
conflict of interest statute. 3 The Delaware Supreme Court has emphati-
cally stated that "when directors ... are on both sides of a transaction,
51. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1997).
52. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. 1952) (holding
that the directors of a manufacturing corporation improperly entered into sales distribution
contracts with a sales company controlled by majority shareholders, thus reducing profits of the
manufacturing corporation).
53. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218,222 (Del. 1976) (stating that Delaware's
conflict of interest statute does not eliminate the intrinsic fairness test for conflict of interest
transactions).
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they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain."'54
G. Dilution of Shareholder Interests
Some black letter corporate law provisions have their genesis in
equity. Consequently, despite specific regulatory standards, underlying
equitable doctrine retains considerable force. Recognition and applica-
tion of shareholder preemptive rights is an example of equity's
irrepressible role in an area that express statutory provisions appear to
dominate.
Preemptive rights developed judicially to protect shareholders against
involuntary dilution of their equity interests. Such rights were-and
remain-particularly important in smaller corporations where particular
percentage interests are extremely important for voting and profit-
distribution purposes. Where such corporations sought to raise capital
through additional equity offerings, existing shareholders were protected
against dilution through preemptive rights, which accorded them first
options to purchase the new equity in proportionate amounts necessary
to maintain their percentage interests." Shareholders were deemed to
have a proprietary interest in their percentage allocation within the
corporation, thus giving rise to their right to the proportionate purchase
of newly-issued shares.56
In recent years, the preemptive rights doctrine has fallen on hard
times. Many states, consistent with the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act,57 have enacted Provisions expressly negating the
existence of preemptive rights unless otherwise stated in the articles of
incorporation. Moreover, statutes set forth specific limitations on
preemptive rights even if adopted in the articles, unless the articles state
otherwise. The backlash against preemptive rights was fuelled by the
concern by many corporate promoters that the doctrine is disruptive of
capital-raising efforts. Moreover, it is a matter that can be determined
contractually rather than doctrinally. If potential equity dilution is a
serious issue for some shareholders, they may fend for themselves-so
the argument goes-through protective shareholder agreements or
54. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
55. E.g., Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 78 N.E. 1090, 1094, 1095 (N.Y. 1906).
56. E.g., id.
57. REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.30 (providing that shareholders do not have
preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation so provide).
58. Under Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 6.30(b)(3)(iii), there is no
preemptive right with respect to authorized shares issued within six months from date of
incorporation.
[Vol. 48
CORPORATE NATURAL LAW
limitations on board actions. The concerns led to amendments to state
statutes that essentially replaced the judicially-developed preemptive
rights doctrine by statutory standards.
Not surprisingly, positive law's absorption of the preemptive rights
doctrine has not quieted judicial application of equitable principles. For
example, several courts have examined circumstances in which
preemptive rights granted to minority shareholders raised equitable
concerns, such as the purchase price is set too high for shareholders to
afford, or is set so low that shareholders must purchase for fear of
substantial dilution of their economic interest. Although the courts have
not uniformly settled the issue, some courts have denied the validity of
the corporation's intended issuance of shares despite the fact that the
preemptive rights provisions were literally followed." The overriding
concern of fairness to minority shareholders trumped literal compliance
with the statutory requirements.
Similarly, courts have intervened to protect shareholder interests even
where the statute or articles of incorporation expressly deny preemptive
rights. In one New York case, two families each owned fifty percent of
the shares and each elected two directors to the four-person board (a
sure recipe for danger). Upon the death of one of the directors, the
board was temporarily controlled by one faction which proceeded to
authorize the issuance of several shares to its side, thus tipping the
balance of power. Although no preemptive rights were formally
accorded by statute or the articles, the court declared that proportionate
stock interests in a close corporation cannot be altered without consent
except for a bona fide business purpose.' The court thus created
preemptive rights contrary to statutory authority." One can readily
imagine corporate counsel's concern if asked to opine on the validity of
the board's resolution to issue additional shares. Here again is a clear
case of corporate "natural law" superseding black letter law.
H. Personality Clashes and Freeze-Outs
Students of corporate law are familiar with the internecine battles
that often arise within close corporations. A common scenario is as
follows: (i) founders (whether they be brothers, sisters, best of friends,
59. E.g., Katzowitz v. Sidler, 249 N.E.2d 359, 364-65 (N.Y. 1969) (invalidating transfer
where cash-short minority shareholder could not afford to purchase additional shares that were
being offered at fraction of true value in order to dilute the minority shareholder's interest);
contra Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 97 N.E.2d 122, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (declining to inquire
into fairness of price at which shares were offered).
60. Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334, 338 (N.Y. 1975).
61. See id.
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or anyone else) form a company; (ii) no written shareholder agreements
or other protective measures are created-after all, the parties love one
another; (iii) the company prospers; (iv) after some period of time,
either (a) one of the founders dies, with his or her interest being
transferred to a spouse or child who does not get along with the other
founders, or (b) relationships among the founders or families sour due
to personal or business-related reasons; (v) one family side or group
controls a majority of the shares or the board and a decision is made
that the services of the person or family on the "outs" are no longer
needed; (vi) the "outs" are removed from all salaried positions, thus
losing the income stream received since the initial corporate formation;
and (vii) dividends are cut or suspended, thereby eliminating the only
other source of distributions to those in disfavor. Variations on this
theme abound. The common thread is that those in control of the
corporate machinery "freeze out" the disfavored minority from all profit-
sharing distributions. The company continues to prosper, but the "outs"
have neither salaries nor dividends in which to share. The typical pattern
might include efforts by the majority to purchase the minority shares,
probably at substantially discounted values, but often the majority sees
no reason to offer even that bone as long as they continue to enjoy
economic benefits to the exclusion of the others.
At this point, with neither an income flow nor marketable shares, the
disfavored minority might seek judicial relief. Corporate law
contractarians will generally respond that the minority must lie in the
bed that they made. That is, the parties had the opportunity at the outset
to protect their respective interests through shareholder agreements and
provisions in the articles of incorporation.62 In this view, failure to take
protective measures is the fault of those suffering the consequences.
Accordingly, they should not look to courts for rescue from their own
lack of foresight. Some courts have adopted that position,63 leaving the
minority with no recourse.
Opposing the contractarian ideology is a viewpoint that appeals to
the compassionate soul, namely that principals within a close corpora-
tion should follow a mutually deferential policy towards each other.
Massachusetts courts currently are in the forefront of this perspective.
A series of cases in that state apply the principle that shareholders in a
62. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act expressly sanctions such agreements.
See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 7.32 (allowing shareholder agreements covering all aspects
of their relationships if not contrary to public policy).
63. E.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (observing that a minority
shareholder had the opportunity to contract for certain protection, and that it "would do vio-
lence... to corporat[e] law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a [corporate
action] for which the parties had not contracted").
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close corporation have fiduciary obligations equivalent to the high
fiduciary duties owed by partners within a partnership.' For example,
in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,65 the fact pattern resem-
bled the generic description set forth above. The court did not approach
the permissibility of the plaintiff's dismissal as a director and officer
and the cessation of salary payments to him as a question of statutory
authority. Rather, asserting that the denial of employment could be
"pernicious in some instances," the court determined that the majority
had not met the burden imposed upon them to prove a legitimate
business purpose for severing Wilkes from the payroll.66 The case was
remanded for a finding of damages.67
Most states allow minority shareholders a cause of action based upon
"oppressive!' conduct by directors or other shareholders. 8 Statutory
provision for this cause of action is commonly found within the judicial
dissolution provisions. The "oppressive" conduct provision is perhaps
the corporate code's most explicit recognition of equity's role in
corporate affairs. Whatever "oppression" may be, it requires neither
fraud nor illegality. It is directed to the "oppressed" shareholder and
places the spotlight on the shareholder's interests rather than corporate
goals, and it is not only the interest as a shareholder that may be
affected. Cases involving oppressive conduct include corporate actions
taken against shareholders in varying capacities such as director, officer,
employee, or shareholder.69
A family squabble in New Jersey illustrates the Solomonic manner
in which some courts respond to charges of oppression. The story began
with the corporation's founding father splitting his shares unequally
between his daughters, Ruth and Judith." Ruth's husband ran the
company.7 Judith was a somewhat passive director who received a
substantial annual payment from the corporation.72 Later on, Judith's
son and future daughter-in-law were employed by the company.73 In
64. See, e.g., Donohue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 382 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
65. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
66. Id. at 662-63.
67. Id. at 664.
68. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act contains such an authorization "in a
proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that.., the directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted ... in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent." REV. MODEL
Bus. CORP. Acr § 14.30. Approximately 35 states have adopted a similar provision. Robert B.
Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause ofActionfor Oppression, 48 Bus. L. 699,709 n.70 (1993).
69. Id. at 714.
70. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1021 (N.J. 1993).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1021-22.
73. Id. at 1022.
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time came the intra-family friction.' Next came Judith's removal as
director, then the firing of her son and departure of daughter-in-law elect
(who happened to be the company's top salesperson).' Judith sued
under New Jersey's "oppressive" conduct provision based on the loss of
her and her family members' positions.76 Adopting the "reasonable
expectation" test used in many jurisdictions, the court determined that
Judith had a reasonable expectation when she received her shares that
she would remain a director and continue to receive annual payments. 7
Thus, continuing payments to Judith were required.78 However, because
her son and his fiance were later arrivals on the scene, Judith could have
no reasonable expectation as to their continued employment.79 Having
thus resolved the claims, the court used its bully pulpit to admonish
Ruth's faction (the majority) to assure that Judith received "financial
benefits commensurate with her holdings."8 "
Whether that bit of dictum became an invitation for further litigation
depends on the good behavior of Ruth, her husband, and their cohorts.
What is clear, though, is that the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in
keeping with many other courts, were prepared to roll up their sleeves,
delve into the arcane battleground of internecine family disputes, and
resolve the conflict through equitable remedies. Indeed, the decisions
give hardly a passing glance at the statutory formulae under which
majority shareholders elect the board, the board appoints officers and
sets salaries, and minority shareholders, like children, are to be seen but
not heard.
I. Shareholder Voting Rights
Shareholder voting rights are well defined in each corporate statute,
subject to modification by the articles of incorporation. Unless voting
rights are specifically granted, shareholders have no right to demand a
vote as to a particular corporate matter. In general, shareholder voting
is limited to the election of directors and to such major corporate actions
as mergers, sale of all or substantially all assets, and dissolution.
Enter the courts. In at least two well-known areas, courts have
intervened to require shareholder voting where the statute may indicate
otherwise. One involves the sale of corporate assets, the other the de
74. See id. at 1021.
75. Id. at 1021, 1022.
76. Id. at 1021-22.
77. Id. at 1033-34.
78. Id. at 1034.
79. Id. at 1033.
80. Id. at 1034.
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facto merger doctrine. In the former, the statutes uniformly restrict
shareholder voting to those sales that involve "all or substantially all"
of the corporate assets."' When statutory framers want to use a majority
concept, they certainly do so. Thus, the phrase "all or substantially all"
appears to reflect a standard well above a majority percentage. Yet,
Delaware courts have on at least two occasions noted that the percentage
standard might not be the principal standard. In one case, where only
twenty-six percent of the corporate assets were sold, the court ap-
proached the question of shareholder voting by asking whether the
proposed sale was of assets "quantitatively vital" to the corporation,
affecting its existence and purpose. 2 In another instance, involving the
sale of a subsidiary's assets that represented fifty-one percent of the
parent's assets, the court required a shareholder vote on the basis of the
"radical departure" that the sale would effect in the parent's business.83
The statute was interpreted by these courts in a non-numerical manner,
quite contrary to a plain reading. These cases reflect the judicial attitude
that it is not right as a matter of principle for shareholders to be
powerless in the face of major proposed transactions. If it is possible to
interpret the statute to require shareholder voting, fairness dictates such
an interpretation.
The de facto merger doctrine is similarly a judicial intrusion into the
tidy world of black letter law. Statutory mergers uniformly require
shareholder approval by the shareholders of the company that is being
acquired. 4 If management of the merging entities desire to avoid such
a vote, perhaps because of appraisal rights or fear of rejection, the
transaction might be structured to technically avoid the shareholder
voting requirement. One possibility, for example, would be an upside-
down transaction that technically turns the acquiring company into the
acquired company, and vice versa, thereby perhaps avoiding a share-
holder vote by the nominal acquiring company. Such technical evasions
have not been accepted by some courts and have led to the so-called "de
facto merger" doctrine. Under that doctrine, if the transaction is
functionally one that, but for its technical arrangement, would have
required a shareholder vote, that vote remains necessary.8 Compliance
81. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1997).
82. Gimbel v. The Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. Ch. 1974).
83. Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981). Interestingly, shareholders
of a parent corporation ordinarily have no voting rights as to a subsidiary, yet this question was
entirely avoided by the court. See id. at 1274-76.
84. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1997). A vote by shareholders of the acquiring
company often depends upon the nature of the consideration and changes, if any, to the
acquirer's articles of incorporation. E.g., id.
85. See, e.g.. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410, 417-18 (Iowa 1965) (holding
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with the strict letter of the statute is of no avail if the courts conclude
that the statute's equitable purpose is being undermined.
Corporate counsel might well ask in frustration, how can I be assured
that statutory compliance suffices to validate my client's proposed
action? By now it may be evident that there is no answer to that
question. Corporate "natural law" will not be denied despite the clearest
of statutory mandates.
J. Insider Trading
An axiomatic rule of corporate law is that insiders who purchase or
sell their company's stock based on confidential information act in
violation of Rule lOb-5 and are subject to both civil and criminal
sanctions. If we seek a rational basis for Rule lOb-5's application to
insider trading, the foundation principles are not readily apparent. It
cannot be the effect of such trading on the market value of the stock,
especially in the common instance where the stock is that of a publicly-
traded corporation. The amount of shares traded by an insider is likely
to be so small compared to the public float or even to the daily trading
volume that market impact is negligible at best. Moreover, any impact
will be in the direction that the stock ought to move if the confidential
information were disclosed. Selling shares (because of confidential
adverse information) puts a downward pressure on the stock price, while
buying (on positive confidential information) creates an upward
pressure, both being exactly the direction that the market would move
with full information.
Nor can insider trading prohibitions be justified by any reliance on
the part of the innocent traders on the other side of the transactions. The
innocents were not impelled into the market by the insider, and the price
at which they bought or sold the stock was no different than if the
insider had not been trading at all. Assuming that the corporation was
justified in not disclosing the confidential information, it made no
difference to the innocents' decisions or to their economic result whether
the insider was buying while they were selling, or vice versa.
Moving up a notch, the argument is heard that the true problem with
insider trading is that it mars the integrity of the market, as non-insiders
will lose confidence in the market if they realize that there may be
informational imbalances. First, this argument suffers from the fact that
most traders already accept the fact that there are inherent, valid
informational imbalances in the market. All traders realize, or should
that a reorganization leading to issuance of shares to third party corporation was a merger with
such corporation and thus required two-thirds shareholder approval).
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realize, that some are more adept at analyzing available information and
have greater prediction capabilities than others. If that were not so, the
entire industry of stock market analysts would be superfluous. (Some
may suggest that is exactly the case, although near-universal reliance
upon analytical gurus by mutual funds and others belies such skepti-
cism.) Thus, traders do not expect that they know as much as everyone
else; sometimes they think they know more, sometimes less. Moreover,
it is difficult to accept the notion that the occasional, minuscule impact
that insider trading might have on a particular stock would deter others
from investing in that security (let alone the market generally),
especially since that impact, if any, would move the stock in its proper
direction.
Shred of conventional rationales, the insider trading doctrine rests
ultimately on a fairness concept. It is simply unfair for insiders to gain
advantages in the market by reason of their superior access to informa-
tion. Insider trading is cheating, and cheating is unfair.86 Agencies and
courts are not willing to countenance the exploitation of status that non-
disclosure of material information brings." The insider trading prohibi-
tion is drawn from traditional agency law. The insider, as agent of the
corporation, breaches a fiduciary duty not to profit by misusing or
usurping confidential information belonging to the corporate principal.
Fiduciary duties are founded on principles of trust and loyalty. The
insider trading rules, cases, and commentaries ultimately reflect and boil
down to these baseline "natural law" standards.
K. And the Mundane
Judicial invocation of fairness principles occurs even in somewhat
ordinary factual circumstances. The Delaware case of Schnell v. Chris
Craft Industries, Inc.S is a good example. Facing an announced proxy
fight with a group of dissident shareholders, the board of directors
amended the corporate bylaws to move the annual shareholders' meeting
date up by one month. 9 The dissident shareholders complained that the
earlier date seriously hampered their solicitation efforts.' ° Defendant
86. See William R. Lucas et al., Common Sense, Flexibility, and Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 51 BUS. L. 1221, 1237 (1996) ("Insider trading is about cheating;
cheating a shareholder, an employer, a client, or even a friend.").
87. E.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d
Cir. 1968) ("Such inequities based upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged
off as inevitable in our way of life, or... remain uncorrected.").
88. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
89. Id. at 439.
90. Id. at 438-39.
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directors argued that they "strictly complied" with the Delaware
Corporation Law in changing the bylaw date.9 The supreme court,
having found that the board utilized corporate machinery simply to
perpetuate itself in office, answered the directors' argument of strict
statutory compliance with the ringing pronouncement that "inequitable
action does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible."92
The Schnell court's declaration of equity's superiority over statutory
law applies to an unlimited range of corporate actions. Corporate codes
are replete with relatively mundane provisions, the application of which
could be challenged on equitable grounds. For example, statutes permit
shareholders to authorize "blank check" preferred stock for eventual
issuance through board determination.93 Given certain circumstances,
it would not be surprising to find a court holding that the "blank check"
is not as blank as it appears. The directors' apparent carte blanche may
be subject to claims ranging from self-dealing to unfair dilution of
existing interests.
Dividends are a similar area nominally controlled by statutory
provisions. Carefully drafted dividend provisions set forth financial
criteria for board declarations. Despite the board's discretion to act
within those explicit standards, there is no reason to doubt that courts
may find equitable grounds to uphold challenges to distributions deemed
contrary to fiduciary principles.
III. CONCLUSION
Corporate law is not unique in recognizing an extensive role for
equitable doctrine. What appears different about corporate law is its
seeming commitment to and dominance by formalistic statutes and
documents. The high stakes often at risk in corporate law issues cause
the corporate bar and their clients to prefer a world of relatively certain
doctrine. There is enormous client pressure to provide unambiguous
opinions from counsel which in turn are often submitted to the clients'
lenders, investors, merger partners, government agencies, and others.
The corporate bar's desire for certainty leads to a continual tinkering
with corporate statutes. Many of those efforts are aimed at clarification,
such as recent amendments to the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act that define the terms "director's conflicting interested transaction"
and "required disclosures" for conflict of interest purposes.94 Such
91. Id. at 439.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., REv. MODEL Bus. CODE ANN. § 6.02(a).
94. See id. § 8.60(l), (2).
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efforts are valiant, and clarification efforts are appropriate, but they
cannot cause us to forget Holmes' caution that "certainty is generally
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man."95
This essay is not intended to suggest that corporate lawyers put down
their Delaware advance sheets and pick up the collected works of
Ronald Dworkin. On the other hand, it would not do lawyers any harm
to develop an understanding of Dworkin's "rights" thesis.96 Lawyers
clearly appreciate changing doctrine. That is well illustrated by the
attention given in recent years to the law and economics movement.
Younger corporate lawyers are more likely to be mesmerized by the
seeming certainty suggested by statutes, articles, bylaws, and shareholder
agreements. Older lawyers may have witnessed enough of equity's
interference with explicit statutory authority and carefully crafted
agreements to be much more circumspect in relying upon explicated
standards. Such lawyers can relate well to Philip Howard's description
of "common sense" decisionmaking by government institutions: "The
sunlight of common sense shines.., whenever principles control: What
is right and reasonable, not the parsing of legal language, dominates the
discussion."97
Having come to the end of this short piece, it is my hope that the
notion of corporate natural law does not strike the reader as foreign-
sounding or oxymoronic as first appeared. Despite all the trappings of
formalism, there is scarcely an area of corporate law that does not lend
itself to the potential superiority of fairness principles over black letter
law. However, appreciation of that fact is insufficient. Much more
important (and here a study of jurisprudential scholarship may well be
advisable) is an understanding of the parameters of fairness concepts,
appropriate application of equitable doctrine, and the dynamic tension
and opportunities created by interplay between the "is" and the "ought"
of corporate law. How applicable are the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
[i]f the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider
more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which
95. Holmes, supra note 2, at 466.
96. Dworkin argues that law is not a collection of rules alone but is also endowed with
controlling principles, the principles being especially important in hard cases where rules do not
clearly resolve the disputes. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31-39 (1977).
The governing principles are based upon perceived individual rights in a liberal sense, and
judicial decisions involve the application and enforcement of those rights. See id. at 39-45.
97. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is SUFFOCATING
AMERICA 177 (1994) (arguing that there is far too little common sense decisionmaking in
government as agencies regard themselves limited by rules and regulations).
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the rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes
would hesitate where now they are confident, and see that
really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions."
Debatable and burning questions will survive every effort at statutory
codification and reduction of corporate interests to written articles,
bylaws, and shareholder agreements. Fairness and equity doctrine will
so often influence these questions that the corporate lawyer's province
necessarily extends well beyond the perimeters suggested by formal
documentation. The admonition to recognize and accommodate such
expanded horizons should be welcomed, not shunned, as it illuminates
the life and vitality of the complex world of human beings interacting
within the metaphysical entities we call corporations.
98. Holmes, supra note 2, at 468. Holmes generally has been treated as a legal positivist
because of his insistence upon the separation of law and morality. In this centennial year of the
Path of the Law article, it might be well to reconsider that characterization as perhaps too
narrow in light of Holmes' continual emphasis upon the role of societal considerations in the
growth of legal principles.
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